

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS  
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN  
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN  
AMEMBASSY GABORONE  
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
XMT AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

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CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EEC, PFOR

SUBJECT: US/EC PRESIDENCY DIALOGUE--JANUARY 25-26  
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EC NINE POLITICAL DIRECTORS MEETING (SOUTHERN AFRICA)

REF: LONDON 00262

1. IN CONNECTION WITH SUBJECT MEETING, EMBASSY IS  
REQUESTED TO CONVEY FOLLOWING TO BRITISH IN THEIR EC  
PRESIDENCY CAPACITY.

2. QUOTE--

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA HIGH PRIORITY ON ITS FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA. THE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES WHICH WERE LAUNCHED DURING THE PAST YEAR BY THE UNITED STATES TO FIND NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF NAMIBIA AND ..IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE BRITISH ..OF RHODESIA, HAVE BOTH REACHED DIFFICULT STAGES, BUT THEY SHALL CONTINUE. IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE OUR POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA UNDER INTENSIVE REVIEW AS WELL.

#### RHODESIA

OUR GOAL IN RHODESIA REMAINS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A PEACEFUL AND RAPID TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE WHICH PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF THE WHITE MINORITY, LEADS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE SUCCESSOR REGIME AND PRE-CLUDES SOVIET INTERVENTION. WE HAVE FULLY SUPPORTED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO FIND A MIDDLE GROUND WHICH WOULD ENABLE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN AGAIN. WE HAVE MAINTAINED CLOSE CONTACT WITH AMBASSADOR RICHARD DURING HIS AFRICAN TOUR.

PROSPECTS THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON RHODESIA WILL REASSEMBLE AND PROCEED TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME ARE VERY UNCERTAIN. THE PARTIES TO THE CONFERENCE ARE DIVIDED  
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OVER THE ISSUE OF WHAT FORM OF TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL RULE RHODESIA DURING THE PERIOD LEADING TO MAJORITY RULE AND INDEPENDENCE.

SALISBURY HAS INDICATED THAT IT WILL NOT MOVE SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND SMITH'S SEPTEMBER 24 SPEECH, BUT HAS NOT CLOSED THE DOOR TO MODIFY SOMEWHAT THEIR POSITION. THE RHODESIANS WISH, IN SHORT, THAT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT BE A TWO-TIERED AFFAIR WITH THE UPPER TIER, THE COUNCIL OF STATE, INCLUDING EQUAL EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN REPRESENTATION. THE RHODESIANS STAND BY THEIR CLAIM THAT THE MINISTRIES OF LAW AND ORDER STAY IN WHITE HANDS DURING THE TRANSITION.

THE AFRICANS AND OTHERS TOOK SMITH'S UNBENDING ADHERENCE TO THE ORIGINAL FIVE POINTS AS EVIDENCE THAT HE EITHER DID NOT REALLY WANT THE GENEVA TALKS TO SUCCEED OR SAW IN THE FIVE POINTS A WAY TO FRUSTRATE THE ULTIMATE ACHIEVEMENT OF MAJORITY RULE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, SMITH'S READINESS TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THE COMMITMENT MADE IN HIS SEPTEMBER 24 SPEECH, AS WELL AS HIS WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIVE POINTS, WAS NEVER SERIOUSLY TESTED.

THE NATIONALISTS ARE BADLY DIVIDED AND THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS HAVE ACCENTUATED THE DIVISION BY THROWING THEIR SUPPORT ON JANUARY 9 TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WHICH REPRESENTS THE MUGABE AND NKOMO DELEGATIONS, THEREBY EXCLUDING MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE. IN GENEVA THE NATIONALISTS HELD TO THE POSITION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF TRANSITION SHOULD BE A ONE-TIER GOVERNMENT WITH A CLEAR AFRICAN MAJORITY. THEY DID NOT ACCEPT WHITE CONTROL OF DEFENSE AND LAW AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITION. AMBASSADOR RICHARD IS ADVANCING SUGGESTIONS FOR REACHING A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE NATIONALISTS AND THE

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RHODESIANS.

DURING THE COURSE OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THE CHRISTMAS RECESS, VIOLENCE IN RHODESIA ESCALATED. NATIONALIST FORAYS INTO RHODESIA FROM MOZAMBIQUE HAVE BEEN INCREASING. RHODESIAN INCURSIONS INTO BOTSWANA HAVE BECOME A SERIOUS CONCERN, AND HAVE BROUGHT BOTSWANA TO CALL FOR SECURITY COUNCIL HELP. THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE ON THE ZAMBIAN BORDER IS REAL. EVEN THOUGH INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM ARE MORE WIDESPREAD WITHIN RHODESIA THAN AT ANY POINT IN THE PAST, THE RHODESIAN SECURITY FORCES HAVE MORE THAN HELD THEIR OWN. WHILE THE NUMBER OF INSURGENTS ENTERING RHODESIA HAS INCREASED, THEIR EFFECTIVENESS HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY HAMPERED BY POOR TRAINING AND DIRECTION. THE RAIDS INTO MOZAMBIQUE SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE IN DESTROYING GUERRILLA BASE CAMPS AND DISRUPTING THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES ACROSS THE BORDER. MOZAMBIQUE'S INABILITY TO DEFEND THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAS FORCED IT CALL FOR FRONT LINE ASSISTANCE. DELIVERIES OF SOVIET ARMS HAVE INCREASED AND THE ARMS DELIVERED ARE MORE SOPHISTICATED.

THEIR RECENT MILITARY SUCCESSES NOTWITHSTANDING, THE LONGER TERM PROSPECTS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF RHODESIA'S WHITE MINORITY REGIME ARE UNRELIEVEDLY BLEAK. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WILL CREATE INCREASING SHORTAGES OF NEEDED FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND INVESTMENT CAPITAL. THE GROWING BURDEN OF FINANCING AN EXPANDING WAR EFFORT WILL FURTHER STRAIN AND DISTORT THE ECONOMY.

CUMULATIVELY, THESE FACTORS -- COUPLED WITH GROWING RHODESIAN AWARENESS THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES CAN THEY EXPECT HELP FROM OUTSIDE -- WILL CAUSE A STEADY AND PERHAPS RAPID EROSION OF EUROPEAN MORALE. SMITH AND THE RHODESIA FRONT MAY ALREADY HAVE BEGUN TO

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REALIZE THAT IF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT SHORT OF SUR-  
RENDER IS TO BE REACHED, IT MUST BE NEGOTIATED  
BEFORE EUROPEAN MORALE REACHES THAT UNPREDICTABLE  
POINT OF IRRETRIEVABLE COLLAPSE. FOR THIS REASON,  
SMITH CANNOT AFFORD TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM THE  
SEARCH FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

SMITH HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO EXPLORE INTERNALLY A POLITICAL  
SETTLEMENT. HE HAS PERMITTED THE ORGANIZATION OF A NEW

AFRICAN POLITICAL GROUP HEADED BY PRO-GOVERNMENT TRIBAL  
CHIEFS. DURING GENEVA AND PRESUMABLY SINCE, SMITH HAS  
SENT OUT FEELERS TO MUZOREWA IN AN EFFORT TO WEAN HIM  
AWAY FROM THE NATIONALIST POSITION. HIS MANEUVERS WILL  
NOT WIN HIM TIME OR SYMPATHY. AFRICANS SEE SMITH'S  
TACTICS AS AN EFFORT TO FRUSTRATE MAJORITY RULE.

UNLESS THE PRESENT DEADLOCK IS BROKEN, VIOLENCE IS  
CERTAIN TO MOUNT IN INTENSITY AND SCALE. SOVIET ARMS  
DELIVERIES, AND AS A CONSEQUENCE SOVIET INFLUENCE, WILL  
INCREASE. WITH MORE ACTIVE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AND A  
CONTINUING IMPASSE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, SOUTH  
AFRICA WILL FIND IT HARDER TO PRESSURE SMITH. SOVIET  
PRESIDENT PODGORNY'S PROJECTED MARCH VISIT WILL FURTHER  
COMPLICATE THE SITUATION AND WORSEN PROSPECTS FOR A  
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH  
SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA AS LONG AS THERE IS REASONABLE  
HOPE OF A SETTLEMENT. AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS, WE  
WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK THE SUPPORT OF OUR EUROPEAN  
ALLIES FOR THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND WHICH WE  
REGARD AS A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN INSURING A PEACEFUL  
TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN RHODESIA. PROPOSALS FOR  
THIS FUND WERE SENT TO EUROPEAN AND OTHER CAPTIALS IN  
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LETTERS FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER AND SECRETARY CROSLAND.

NAMIBIA

THE PROPOSALS FOR THE CREATION OF A NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK  
LEADING TO A SOLUTION OF THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM WHICH WE  
HAVE EXPLORED WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND THE FRONT  
LINE PRESIDENTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOUTH  
WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO).

WE REMAIN FIRMLY COMMITTED TO FULL, RAPID INDEPENDENCE  
FOR NAMIBIA THROUGH A CONFERENCE AT A NEUTRAL LOCATION  
(PROBABLY GENEVA), UNDER UN AUSPICES, IN A FRAMEWORK

WHICH INCLUDES ALL THE PARTIES, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY SWAPO.

BASICALLY WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO WORK OUT A NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK IN WHICH SOUTH AFRICA, SWAPO AND OTHER NAMIBIAN POLITICAL FORCES CAN COME TOGETHER AT THE SAME VENUE WHERE THE NAMIBIANS CAN AMONGST THEMSELVES DETERMINE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THEIR NATION AND

THEN NEGOTIATE WITH SOUTH AFRICA THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS RELATING TO SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONSHIP TO AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA. SOUTH AFRICA HAS BEEN WILLING TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON SUCH A FRAMEWORK.

THROUGHOUT OUR INITIATIVE SWAPO'S PRESIDENT, SAM NUJOMA, HAS MAINTAINED A TOUGH LINE BUT APPEARS TO BE WILLING TO CONTINUE TALKS.

SECRETARY KISSINGER PRESENTED THE NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS DERIVED FROM HIS TALKS WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO NUJOMA IN A NEW YORK MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 29. SINCE THAT MEETING NUJOMA HAS VISITED CUBA, ANGOLA AND SEVERAL NATIONS IN WEST AFRICA, BUILDING UP HIS POSITION

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AND SEEKING FINANCIAL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR HIS MOVEMENT. IN ANGOLA HE APPEARS TO HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO ESTABLISH OPERATIONAL BASES FROM WHICH TO CONDUCT GUERRILLA WARFARE INTO NAMIBIA AND MAY HAVE USED THE SWAPO FORCES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CUBANS AGAINST UNITA REMNANTS. HE HAS ACTIVELY SOUGHT AND APPEARS TO HAVE OBTAINED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR HIS POSITION. IN TURN, THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED NUJOMA TO RESIST INVITATIONS TO ACCEPT THE NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK WE HAVE SUGGESTED.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT HAS ATTEMPTED TO HOLD THE LINE IN NAMIBIA, THEREBY PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. IT DELAYED THE WORK OF THE TURNHALLE CONFERENCE MEETING IN WINDHOEK AND DID NOT ACTIVELY ASSIST THAT CONFERENCE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT AND STEPS LEADING UP TO INDEPENDENCE.

HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE DELAY, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT MAY BE RECONSIDERING ITS POSITION AND MAY YET DECIDE TO PUSH AHEAD WITH ITS ORIGINAL PLAN TO USE THE TURNHALLE CONFERENCE FOR THE RAPID FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD LEAD NAMIBIA TO INDEPENDENCE BY THE END OF 1978. SETTING UP AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE EASY: NONE OF THE MAJOR ISSUES CONCERNING ITS FORM WHICH DIVIDE MOST OF THE BLACK AND

BROWN TURNHALLE DELEGATES FROM THEIR WHITE COUNTER-PARTS, NOR THE ISSUES WHICH SPLIT THE WHITE DELEGATION, HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

IN OUR JUDGMENT, AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS WILL SEEK AN EARLY REVIEW OF THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

AND WILL DEMAND EITHER INCREASED PRESSURE AGAINST SOUTH

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AFRICA OR A CHAPTER VII FINDING THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA IS A THREAT TO INTER-NATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

SOUTH AFRICA

WE CONTINUE TO VIEW THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION WITH GREAT CONCERN. WE BELIEVE THAT THE WEST HAS IMPORTANT INTERESTS IN THE REGION, INTERESTS WHICH CAN BEST BE PROTECTED BY A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF ITS PROBLEMS.

AS THE THREAT OF WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE INCREASES, THESE INTERESTS ARE INCREASINGLY AT RISK. SEVERAL FACTORS ARE CONTRIBUTING TO THE GROWING DANGER:

-- THE GROWING WILLINGNESS OF BLACKS TO ACCEPT VIOLENCE AND RADICAL MEASURES AS THE ONLY WAYS TO EFFECT REAL CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA;

-- THE CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, (DESPITE SIGNS OF FERMENT AMONG SOME OF THE WHITE COMMUNITY) WHICH CONFIRMS THE BLACKS IN THEIR VIEWS ON RADICALISM;

-- THE INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION AS A WHOLE.

IN LIGHT OF THE EVENTS OF THE PAST YEAR, OUR POLICIES IN THE REGION ARE UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW IN WASHINGTON. THAT REVIEW IS CONTINUING AT THIS TIME.

WITH RESPECT TO THESE PROBLEMS, WE WILL WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, AS WE MAKE PLANS TO PROTECT AND ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE.

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END QUOTE.  
KISSINGER

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